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Summary
The decision to revise an educational choice has hardly been analyzed in previous research.
Dropping out is only one possible choice, and we distinguish between dropping out (leaving
the apprenticeship system) and changing or upgrading (stayingwithin the apprenticeship system)
as three possibilities to revise an educational decision, using a dataset that consists of appren-
tices who have dissolved their apprenticeship contract. We analyze the determinants of leaving
apprenticeship training using competing risks models. Dropout decisions seem to be driven by
financial considerations such as financial distress, but local labor market conditions seem to
have no effect on them. Our findings underline the importance of distinguishing between the
different choices instead of focusing exclusively on dropping out.
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1 Introduction
The determinants and consequences of dropout behavior have received considerable atten-
tion from researchers in the past. An extensive literature examines the long-term develop-
ment of high school dropout rates (Heckman/LaFontaine 2007), possible determinants
of the decision to drop out of high school (Card/Lemieux 2000), and its long-term con-
sequences (Oreopoulos 2007). Much less attention has been paid to the possibility that
youths may simply revise an educational decision after a temporary dropout and actu-
ally stay within the educational system, and similarly, much less is known about the
determinants of behavior in apprenticeship training. There are three different possibili-
ties for revisions: youths might change to another schooling choice, they might choose
a more challenging educational program or they might drop out of the educational sys-
tem and either work as unskilled workers or end up unemployed.1 We call these three
different choices changing, upgrading and dropping out, respectively, and provide the
first economic analysis of revisions of educational choices. In this article, we focus on
the distinction between staying in the apprenticeship system (i.e. changing) and leaving it
(i.e., upgrading one’s educational career by going back into general schooling or entering
university, or dropping out).
We believe that it is important to distinguish between the three different choices for the
following two reasons. First of all, treating all youths who decide to revise an educational
decision as dropouts might result in aggregation bias, biased results for the determinants
of dropout decisions and overestimation of dropout rates. While the first two possible
choices (changing and upgrading) are rather unproblematic with respect to long-term
labor market consequences, only the last one (dropping out) carries higher risks, because
increasing qualification requirements and technical progress give dismal prospects to the
unskilled and low-skilled labor force. As pointed out in previous research (Schmid/Stalder
2012), dissolving an apprenticeship contract can also be seen as a dissolution of bad
matches on the apprenticeship market and result in higher satisfaction with a new appren-
ticeship, if apprentices manage to find another training place. Secondly, treating all revi-
sions as dropouts results in lower estimation efficiency as compared to distinguishing
between the three different possible choices.
For our empirical analysis of the decision to revise an educational choice, we use a German
data set on revisions of the decision to start apprenticeship training. The big advantage
of this data set is that the different choices can be distinguished very clearly, instead of
focusing solely on dropouts as one educational revision. In addition to this differentiation,
the data set also allows to take into account non-financial as well as financial opportunity
costs of apprenticeship training and perceived bad prospects after finishing apprenticeship
training, whichwas not possible in research using other data sets.We estimate a competing
risks model where we compare the determinants of the choice to leave apprenticeship
training (i.e., to drop out or to upgrade) vs. the decision to stay within apprenticeship
training (i.e., to change).
Our results suggest that financial incentives seem to matter for the decision to drop out
of apprenticeship training. Those individuals who named financial distress as a reason
to dissolve their apprenticeship contract have significantly higher hazards of dropping
out, as compared to upgrading or changing. We also find that apprentices’ previous level
1 This is a simplified approach based on previous work, e.g. by Neuenschwander (1998, 1999) and
Neuenschwander et al. (1996). More detailed models might also include choices such as changes
to a more or less challenging occupation.
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of schooling matters for their educational choices: those with higher levels of previous
schooling are more likely to upgrade and less likely to drop out as opposed to staying
within apprenticeship training. Surprisingly, local labor market conditions neither affect
the hazards of upgrading nor of dropping out. However, the most important novel result
is probably the importance of financial reasons for an individual’s decision to drop out.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Part 2 presents a brief literature
review. Part 3 gives some background information on the main institutional features
of the German educational system with a special emphasis on apprenticeship training
and introduces the data set that we used. Part 4 presents theoretical considerations and
discusses the choice of covariates for the empirical analysis. Part 5 presents and discusses
the estimation framework for the empirical analysis and the estimation results, while part
6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
While there is quite a substantive body of research on high school dropouts, there is
almost no previous research on other revisions of educational choices, and much less
research on dropouts in other institutional settings, such as apprenticeship training. A
notable exception are the research works by Neuenschwander (1998, 1999) and Neuen-
schwander et al. (1996). However, we think that the findings from the studies on high
school dropouts are relevant for our research topic as well because the deicision to drop
out is one possible choice in our analysis. Previous studies typically find that more able
individuals are less likely to drop out (see, for instance, Bishop/Mane 2001 for the United
States or Bradley/Lenton 2007 for the United Kingdom). The same seems to be true for
apprentices where studies find that prior level of schooling seems to play an important
role for changing and dropout decisions. Previous research (Neuenschwander et al. 1996,
Neuenschwander 1998, 1999; Alda 2003, Schöngen 2003, Stalder/Schmid 2006) finds
that youths with a higher level of previous schooling are less likely to drop out (as opposed
to staying within the educational system) and less likely to change (as opposed to staying
within their chosen occupation). The importance of schooling can be due to two reasons:
on the one hand, longer schooling should be associated with more ability and hence lead
to less schooling problems, which can subsequently lead to the decision to quit the train-
ing because of high non-monetary costs. On the other hand, more schooling seems to
lead to better decision-making abilities (Cutler/Lleras-Muney 2006), so there are prob-
ably less matching problems and resulting dropout decisions. Additionally, youths with
more prior schooling have in general a larger set of choices available, so they are proba-
bly less often forced to start an apprenticeship just because it was their only option. This
probably also leads to better matches.
In addition to cognitive ability, other factors related to match quality might also play
an important role for apprentices’ decisions to revise educational choices. Fries et al.
(2013) analyze the effect of an employment subsidy on dropout behavior of apprentices.
Interestingly, they also find that personal preferences, such as conflicts with colleagues
or supervisors, a lack of interest in the apprenticeship or a mismatch between expecta-
tions about the apprenticeship and reality are important reasons to drop out. The lack of
information about these possible determinants in the dataset used in our analysis means
that we are not able to analyze them in more detail in our analysis, though.
Previous research also finds important differences in behavior with respect to ethnicity.
While studies for the United States and the United Kingdom find that members of minori-
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ties are less likely to drop out (see Nguyen et al. 2006 for the US and Bradley/Lenton
2007 for the UK), the results are the opposite for apprenticeship training in the German-
speaking countries, and youths with non-German parents seem to fare worse than natives
in the apprenticeship training system. Neuenschwander (1999) finds that apprentices
without Swiss citizenship are more likely to drop out, Stalder and Schmid (2006) find
that natives are significantly more likely to continue their education, and Schöngen (2003)
reports that less ex-apprentices with non-German parents are still planning to continue
their education.
Finally, the regional labor market situation is another possible impact factor on educa-
tional decisions. Montmarquette et al. (2007) find that a higher minimum school-leaving
age, lower minimum wages, and higher unemployment rates all decrease dropout prob-
abilities in Canada. Neuenschwander (1999) finds that there are many apprenticeship
dropouts in Switzerland in fields where there are abundant employment opportunities
for unskilled workers. Mocetti (2012), however, finds no effect of regional youth unem-
ployment rates on school dropout behavior in Italy.
These previous findings suggest that it is important to control for ability, ethnicity and
regional labor market situation in an analysis of revisions of educational choices.
In the next section, we will provide some background information on the German edu-
cational system and introduce the data set that we used for the empirical analysis.
3 Data and background
3.1 Data
Our empirical analysis of dropout and changing behavior of apprentices is based on a sur-
vey of the German Federal Institute for Vocational Education (Bundesinstitut für Berufs-
bildung) in 2002 (Schöngen/Menk 2002).2 Its main advantage is that it allows to distin-
guish the three different possible revision decisions very clearly. In addition, it contains
extensive information on the reasons for the youths’ decision to cancel their apprentice-
ship. There are several questions that allow us to analyze possible impact factors that
have never been used in previous research on the topic, such as the importance of exam
nerves or financial distress. However, as this is a cross-sectional dataset, there is no pos-
sibility to assess the probability that dropouts might still re-enter the educational system.
About one third of dropouts is still planning to find another apprenticeship place, but it
is impossible to analyze their success using this dataset.
The data set also includes information on the regional provenance of respondents. This
enabled us to include regional-level regressors. A more detailed description of the dataset
and descriptive statistics can be found at www.jbnst.de/en.
3.2 Institutions
The following paragraphs give a very brief description of some important characteristics
of the German system of dual vocational training as it relates to our research topic. For
a more complete description, see, for example, Hippach-Schneider and Hensen (2011).
Firm-provided apprenticeship training is still one of the most important ways of entering
the labor market for youths in the German-speaking countries (Ryan 2001). In Germany,
for example, 56.9% of all school leavers started an apprenticeship in 2012, and 24.4%
2 More detailed information on data can be found in the data description at www.jbnst.de/en.
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of all apprenticeship contracts were dissolved prematurely in 2011 (Bundesinstitut für
Berufsbildung 2013), which means that those apprentices either changed into another
apprenticeship, upgraded their educational choice, or dropped out.
After their school graduation, youths who want to continue their education can either
study at universities or polytechnics (Fachhochschulen) if they hold the necessary qual-
ification, enter dual apprenticeship training or full-time vocational schools (Berufsfach-
schule).3 The focus of this work is on revising educational decisions in apprenticeships in
dual apprenticeship training. It consists of in-firm training at the workplace and classes at
a vocational school (Berufsschule). At the moment, there are nearly 350 state-approved
apprenticeship occupations. They last between 2 and 3.5 years and are of general nature
because they finish with a recognized degree, and apprenticeship standards are set cen-
trally. Apprentices earn a small wage set in a collective wage agreement and paid by
their training firms, and youths find their training place either on their own initiative or
through the intermediation of the local employment agency or other institutions.
4 Theoretical considerations
The economic theory of human capital as pioneered by Becker (1962) predicts that a
rational agent will invest in education (as in any other asset) only if it yields a positive
net present value (NPV). Future cost and benefit streams can be discounted in order
to make different alternatives comparable and to identify the optimal one. For several
available choices, an individual will pick the one that yields the highest net present value.
As we analyze the decision to revise educational choices, we have to slightly adjust this
framework and incorporate learning about job or occupation characteristics into the deci-
sion framework. A key feature of educational decisions is that decisionmakers typically
have only incomplete information about costs and benefits related to their choice. Appren-
tices will revise an educational choice after learning more about its characteristics if the
updated expected utility flows outside this choice exceed the updated expectations of
their current choices, plus the costs of changing. A choice that may initially have seemed
profitable might, ceteris paribus, become unprofitable from an individual’s point of view
because of higher than initially expected costs or lower than expected benefits.4 This new
information that apprentices can acquire during their training might then lead them to
revise their initial educational choice in two different directions: they might either upgrade
their educational investment by re-entering general education or entering university, or
they might stop their educational investment altogether and drop out. Those two differ-
ent choices of exiting apprenticeship training should be driven by different determinants.
In order to analyze them, we used several financial and non-financial measures of costs
and benefits of apprenticeship training that we discuss in the following section.
3 These schools exist, among others, for training in technical, health-related or business-related occu-
pations. Some examples are chemical-technical assistants or nurses.
4 An example is the opportunity cost of an apprenticeship training as measured by the relative wage
of apprentices to the wage for unskilled workers. Even if this information might be available ex
ante, adolescents might not fully realize the cost until they start their apprenticeship training.
Having heard about the apprenticeship wage and actually having to “make do” with it might lead
adolescents to reconsider their initial decision.
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As shown in previous research, the prior level of schooling of respondents should influence
their costs of finishing an apprenticeship.5 Those with more previous education should,
ceteris paribus, incur lower learning costs and therefore have lower dropout hazards. They
should also have higher hazards of upgrading their educational choice because only the
holders of an Abitur or Fachabitur are allowed to enroll in universities or universities
of applied sciences (Fachhochschulen). Therefore, we expect individuals with more edu-
cation to have lower hazards to drop out as opposed to changing and to have higher
hazards to upgrade as opposed to changing. We included four dummies for respondents’
previous level of schooling (school dropouts, Realschule, and Gymnasium, as well as the
ones who hold a Fachabitur), using the Hauptschule graduates as a baseline category.
Next, lower financial opportunity costs of apprenticeship training should lead to lower
hazards of dropping out, but should not affect the hazard to upgrade. The reason is that
only dropouts can start working as unskilled workers and realize a higher income by doing
so. Therefore, we constructed a measure of the opportunity cost of an apprenticeship
training, namely, the relative wage of apprentices as compared to unskilled workers in
the same sector.6 The higher this ratio, the less an apprentice can gain from quitting his
training in favor of working as an unskilled worker, and the less likely he should be to
drop out. For the upgraders, however, there should be no effect of this variable.7
Two other cost measures ask for exam nerves and for financial distress during appren-
ticeship training as reasons to dissolve the first apprenticeship contract. Exam nerves are
a form of non-monetary costs due to stress and perceived mental overstrain of school,
and we expect those who suffer from exam nerves to have higher hazards to drop out and
lower hazards to upgrade because the exam nerves would probably get even worse in a
more challenging educational program. For those who experienced financial distress, we
expect higher hazards to drop out because this allows them towork as an unskilled worker
and have a higher income in the short run. We also expect lower hazards to upgrade for
them because enrolling in a more challenging program would mean that they have to
spend an even longer period of time with a low income.
A last cost-related possible impact factor might be being a girl in a predominantly male
occupation or, vice versa, a boy in a predominantly female occupation, defined as occu-
pations with on average more than 60% apprentices of the other gender. The cost could
be due to the fact that youths without peers of the same sex are more often the victims of
5 Previous level of schooling can be seen as a broad measure of ability, but it probably also captures
other characteristics, such as students’ family background. This might bias the estimated coefficients
on schooling level and should be kept in mind when analyzing them. Including items on more
precise ability measures such as respondents’ IQ in more datasets would be desirable to overcome
this problem.
6 The Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung,
BiBB) gathers data on the average salary that the apprentices are paid (Ausbildungsvergütungen),
while the state-level statistical offices compile statistics on the average salaries for workers, depend-
ing on their skill-level and the industry sector where they are working. However, these average
salaries for unskilled workers are not available for all industrial sectors, reducing our sample size
by approximately one third. They are only available for workers in construction, the metalworking
industry, automobile trade and repair, and the credit and insurance industry.
7 There might be the possibility that higher apprentice pay in an occupation might attract more able
apprentices, and this might lead to results being driven by differences in ability and not differences
in relative pay. Again, the lack of information on apprentices’ ability prevents us from controlling
for this possibility.
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bullying at work (see, for instance, Litzcke 2003). We expect higher hazards of dropping
out for apprentices in these occupations, but no impact on upgrading.
On the benefit side, we expect local labor market conditions8 to affect the different choices
in different ways. Wheeler (2001) shows in a matching model that “thicker” labor mar-
kets, i.e. larger labormarkets such as those in cities and agglomerationswithmore employ-
ers, lead to better matching between workers and firms due to lower search costs. This
leads to higher productivity, higher inequality (in pay between different skill groups) and
higher expected returns to skill. Hence, apprentices in “thicker” labor markets should
have more incentives to invest in their human capital and complete their training, ceteris
paribus, than their counterparts in areas where the labor market conditions are less favor-
able. We therefore expect higher hazards of dropping out in regions with a “thin” local
labor market, but no effect on upgrading as opposed to staying.9 For the labor market
supply side, we used the density of the working age population between 15 and 65, and for
the demand side, we used the local unemployment rate as a proxy for the “thickness” of
local labor markets.10 Additionally, the availability of public transport and traffic routes
should also influence the “thickness” of a local labor market. Commuting should be much
easier in areas where there is a better transport network disposable because more jobs
can be reached within reasonable time spans. We included the “population accessible
by public transport within one hour”, a commonly used measure in regional planning,
as a measure of transport smoothness that should affect the “thickness” of local labor
markets.
Three questions aim at capturing the perceived long-term benefits of an apprenticeship:
they ask for the importance of bad employment prospects after the apprenticeship, bad
income and bad career prospects, respectively.11 With respect to those long-term determi-
nants, we expect a high importance of bad prospects as a reason to upgrade.When appren-
tices realize during their training that their chosen occupation has bad career prospects
or income prospects, they should have incentives to upgrade their education with result-
ing better career and income prospects and therefore have higher hazards to upgrade
as opposed to changing. For the decision to drop out as opposed to staying within the
apprenticeship system, we expect no effect of those three variables.
8 As the spatial bound of a local labor market, we took the size of the respective Chamber’s area.
The relative immobility of apprentices can be seen as a justification for this simplifying assumption.
9 Data on district level are available from the German Federal Office for Building and Regional Plan-
ning’s “Indicators and Maps on Spatial and Urban Development” (Indikatoren und Karten zur
Raum- und Stadtentwicklung, INKAR). These district-level data were then aggregated on chamber
level and merged to the original data set, so that each individual was also assigned regional-level
characteristics. We used information on regional unemployment rates, surface, working age pop-
ulation (between age 15 and 65) and availability of public transport. The working age population
density is calculated as the ratio of working age population and surface. The availability of public
transport is measured as the population that can be reached within one hour by public trans-
port (“Erreichbares Bevölkerungspotential”), a commonly used measure in spatial development
research.
10 Results did not change when we used the youth unemployment rate instead.
11 Labor market data on wages for successful graduates of apprenticeship training would probably
provide a better measure of long-term benefits. However, there are two main reasons why this
impossible: first of all, not all apprentices work in their apprenticeship occupation after their grad-
uation. See Seibert (2007) for more details. Secondly, and more importantly, wages by occupation
are only available on the national level and for former Eastern vs. former Western Germany, but
not at the federal state or even local level that would be needed for our analysis. Therefore, we
used the (possibly) distorted measure reported by the respondents instead.
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In order to control for the fact that there are considerable differences in the labor mar-
kets for apprentices across the different regions in our data set, we also used data from
the German Federal Employment Agency’s statistics (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) on the
labor market for apprentices and on the numbers of youth enrolled in full-time schools
for usually dually provided occupations. The employment centers gather information on
registered apprenticeship-seeking youths and on registered open apprenticeship places,
and calculate a supply-demand ratio (the number of offered apprenticeship places per 100
apprenticeship seekers).12 Secondly, we included ameasure aiming at capturing the relative
frequency of non-firm-provided training in full-time vocational schools (überbetriebliche
Ausbildung). This is a labor market policy measure where youths complete apprentice-
ship training in full-time schools, and not in both a firm and a school. We included the
percentage of youths in this labor market measure among all youths in apprenticeship
training in a region to control for the situation on the market for apprenticeships. These
regressors were included to control for the fact that it is easier to find a new apprentice-
ship place in more favorable local training markets, leading to lower hazards of dropping
out. However, the situation on the market for apprenticeships should clearly not affect
the hazards of upgrading.
Finally, we also included control variables for gender, having non-German parents, firm
size and field of apprenticeship.
5 Estimation methods and results
5.1 Methods
As we are interested in the timing of the decision to revise an educational choice, we
estimated competing risks models.
Cancellations of apprenticeship contracts can occur daily, but are only observed in 5 time
intervals (probation time, later during the first year, and in the second, third, and fourth
years, respectively.) Therefore, we follow a continuous time hazard function approach
where durations are interval censored (Prentice/Gloecker 1978; Narendranathan/Stewart
1993; Jenkins 1995). However, because not all apprenticeships last 3 or 3.5 years, we
only included three dummy variables for probation time, later during the first year, and
the second year. There are several possibilities to analyze this type of data.
One possibility is to make assumptions about the shape of the hazard rate within each
time interval because this shape cannot be identified from the data at hand.13 Allison
12 However, as the employment centers can only use registered numbers for their calculations, these
numbers do not give a complete picture of regional apprenticeship markets. Many places are filled
directly without the intermediation of the job centre and are therefore not included in the centres’
statistics. See, for instance, Ulrich (2006) for a more complete discussion of the topic.
13 An alternative approach would be the one by Meyer (1990), who shows that the discrete form of a
continuous time proportional hazards model takes the form of a complementary log-log model. This
framework allows to take into account unobserved heterogeneity, also known as “frailty” in the
hazard rate literature. We used a parametric Gamma-distributed heterogeneity term and chose this
distribution because Abbring and van den Berg (2007) have shown that for exponential mixtures,
the distribution of heterogeneity among survivors converges rapidly to a Gamma distribution.
However, a test of the null hypothesis that the unobserved heterogeneity variance component is
equal to zero could not be rejected. Estimation and test results using this approach are provided
in Appendix B at www.jbnst.de/en.
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(1982) defines a discrete-time hazard rate Ptj for each possible event:
Ptj = Pr
(
T = t, J = j | T ≥ t) (1)
The resulting likelihood function can be written as
L =
n∏
i=1
[
Ptiji
1 − Pti
]δi ti∏
k=1
(1 − Pk) (2)
Again, as in Allison (1982), we assume a particular functional form for the destination-
specific discrete-time hazards and get the following expression:
Ptj =
exp[αjt + β ′jxt]
1 +
∑
l
exp[αlt + β ′lxt]
for j = 1, . . . ,m
which simplifies to the following for our analysis with three possible destinations
Pr(T = t, J = j|T ≥ t,x) =
exp[αjt + β ′jx]
1 +
∑
l∈A,B
exp[αlt + β ′lx]
where j ∈ A,B,C denotes the three possible destinations of upgrading, dropping out and
changing, with the latter being the base category. Substituting (2) into (1) and taking
logs, we get the same log-likelihood as the one for a multinomial logit model and can
estimate this equation with re-organized data (Jenkins 1995).
5.2 Results
The following table displays results for competing risks estimations. The different states
into which a transition is possible are upgrading and dropping out, with the changers
as those who stay within the apprenticeship training system as the base category. ***,
**, and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. We present
exponentiated coefficients that can be interpreted as hazard ratios and results for a model
with (I) and without (II) the opportunity cost measure.14 The effect of the regressor of
interest on the hazard is significantly positive if the hazard ratio is significantly larger than
one and significantly negative if the hazard ratio is significantly smaller than one. Besides
that, coefficients can be interpreted similarly to a multinomial logit model. Additional
estimations following the approach by Meyer (1990) can be found in Appendix B at
www.jbnst.de/en. These estimations confirmed the results presented here.
14 One might be worried that differences in results between those two estimations are because of
differences in sample size and not because of the opportunity cost/relative wage variable. However,
estimation results using the first sample but excluding the opportunity cost measure (not shown
here) showed identical results, with only very few minor changes in significance levels. Results are
available upon request from the corresponding author.
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Table 1 Competing Risks Model, exponentiated coefficients
Upgrade I Dropout I Upgrade II Dropout II
d1 0.693 0.036*** 0.672 0.082***
[0.715] [0.011] [0.413] [0.017]
d2 1.309 0.100*** 1.054 0.148***
[1.339] [0.029] [0.650] [0.031]
d3 1.562 0.289*** 1.003 0.291***
[1.633] [0.079] [0.648] [0.062]
apprenticeship wage/wage unskilled 0.001*** 0.004***
[0.002] [0.005]
1 = non-native parents 0.956 1.421 0.971 1.499*
[0.487] [0.403] [0.351] [0.322]
1 = female 0.437** 0.672 0.460*** 0.697*
[0.161] [0.181] [0.130] [0.131]
1 = male in occupation with 0.456** 0.82 0.509** 0.838
more than 60% females [0.182] [0.174] [0.151] [0.139]
1 = female in occupation with 1.662 1.506 1.272 1.189
more than 60% males [0.629] [0.405] [0.359] [0.224]
1 = school dropout 1.041 1.667 1.559 1.925**
[1.109] [0.588] [1.185] [0.497]
1 = Realschule 2.364** 0.592*** 2.226*** 0.602***
[0.859] [0.116] [0.647] [0.088]
1 = Fachabitur 3.586** 0.236** 4.840*** 0.381**
[2.039] [0.140] [2.009] [0.153]
1 = Abitur 8.222*** 0.203** 11.329*** 0.334***
[3.631] [0.128] [3.690] [0.123]
1 = bad prospects 0.375 1.289 1.004 0.957
reason for termination [0.324] [0.587] [0.565] [0.356]
1 = bad income prospects 0.782 1.648 0.862 1.489
reason for termination [0.472] [0.564] [0.390] [0.390]
1 = bad career prospects 1.945 0.597 1.486 0.689
reason for termination [1.077] [0.317] [0.658] [0.278]
1 = exam nerves 0.364 1.081 0.221 0.987
reason for termination [0.379] [0.352] [0.226] [0.231]
1 = financial distress 0.823 2.565*** 0.598 1.769***
reason for termination [0.621] [0.679] [0.363] [0.361]
local percentage of youth 14.7 0.000 29.728 16.711
in out-of-firm training [132.361] [0.000] [195.902] [82.084]
local population density 0 0 0 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
local density of public transport 0.926 8.225 0.686 2.075
[1.038] [7.226] [0.553] [2.084]
local unemployment rate 0.843 43.165 0.009 96.791
[6.388] [215.227] [0.046] [327.153]
n 1967 3389
LogL −789.456 −1386.96
d1–d3 denote the timing of the dissolution of the apprenticeship contract (i.e. during probation, later during the
first year, and during the second year, respectively). Estimations include controls for the field of apprenticeship,
the firm size and various regional labor market characteristics, namely, the local percentage of youth in out-of-firm
training, the local population density, the supply-demand ratio on the local market for apprenticeship places, the
local density of public transport, and dummies for federal states. The local unemployment rate and the relative
apprenticeship wage were rescaled by multiplying them with 100. Estimated coefficients can be interpreted similarly
to a multinomial logit model. n refers to person-period and not to person observations. Full results can be found
in Appendix B at www.jbnst.de/en.
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Duration effects are captured by the dummy variables on the period of time in which the
apprenticeship contract was terminated (i.e. probation, remainder of first year, second
year). While no effects are found for the transition rates into upgrading, those who ter-
minated their contract in these relatively early time periods of their apprenticeship have
significantly lower hazards of dropping out. This is a result in line with descriptive previ-
ous findings (see, for example, Schöngen 2003). Those youths who have not invested too
much time in a first apprenticeship might me more willing to change to another occu-
pation instead of dropping out. This conjecture, however, is impossible to test with the
dataset at hand.
The previous level of schooling affects the transition rates into upgrading and into drop-
ping out, as expected. We find that individuals with higher previous levels of education
(Realschule, Fachabitur, Abitur) have significantly higher hazards of upgrading and sig-
nificantly lower hazards of dropping out. For the holders of an Abitur, this is probably
due to the fact that they also have the right to enter universities or universities of applied
sciences (Fachhochschulen). Also, the costs of learning are probably lower for individu-
als with a higher level of education, making them more likely to enter full-time educa-
tion again. Apprentices who are school dropouts, on the other hand, have a significantly
higher hazard of dropping out from apprenticeship training as well. These findings con-
firm results from previous research on the topic and provide evidence for our theoretical
prediction that individuals with more schooling should have higher hazards of upgrading
and lower hazards of dropping out.
We expected a high importance of bad income and career prospects on the hazards of
upgrading as opposed to changing within apprenticeship training while we did not expect
to find any impact on the hazards of dropping out as opposed to changing. However,
we find that the hazards of dropping out are significantly higher for those who said thad
bad income perspectives were a reason for them to terminate their first apprenticeship
in the larger sample. It might be the case that those individuals are planning to enter
another educational path but have not done so yet, and it might also be the case that
those individuals also are currently in financial distress. In fact, those who cited financial
distress as a reason to terminate their first apprenticeship contract are also significantly
more likely to drop out as opposed to changing to another apprenticeship, probably also
because they have the possibility to work as unskilled laborers and having a higher income
than an apprentice by doing so.
We expected that lower financial opportunity costs of apprenticeship training, measured
as the apprenticeship wage relative to the wage of an unskilled laborer, should lead to
lower hazards of dropping out as opposed to changing, but should not affect the other
choice. While this hypothesis is confirmed for the dropouts, we also find that higher
relative wages for apprentices lead to lower hazards of upgrading as opposed to changing.
A tentative explanation could be that apprentices in relatively well-paid occupations tend
to change into similarly well-paid occupations or simply change their training firm but
stay within the same occupation.
For youths in occupations with a majority of apprentices of the other gender, we expected
higher hazards of dropping out because of a lack of peers of the same gender, but no
impact on upgrading. However, we find that boys in a predominantly female occupation
are significantly less likely to upgrade as opposed to change within apprenticeship train-
ing in the larger sample, while there is no such effect for girls in a predominantly male
occupation. This result might be because of large numbers of apprentices with a lower
secondary school degree (Hauptschulabschluss/Realschulabschluss) in occupations that
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are often chosen by girls, such as retail, office assistant and doctor’s receptionist, and a
lack of opportunity to upgrade for these apprentices because they are not able to enter
university.
We find no effects whatsoever of local labor and apprenticeship market characteristics
on upgrading and dropping out, which is surprising. Higher than expected mobility of
apprentices and therefore less influence of labor market conditions on their choices might
be an explanation for this result.
Similar to previous research findings on the German apprenticeship system, our results
suggest that apprentices with non-German parents have higher hazards of dropping out
in the larger sample. There are no effects of ethnicity on the hazards of upgrading.
Finally, with respect to gender, we find that female apprentices have significantly lower
hazards to upgrade as opposed to changing into another apprenticeship. This could be
explained by female apprentices being less confident about entering more challenging
educational choices.
The overall results seem to suggest that there are indeed remarkable differences in behavior
across the different educational choices and that it is useful to distinguish between them
instead of focusing exclusively on dropouts.
6 Conclusion
In the present paper, we analyzed revisions of youths’ educational choices. Unlike previous
research, we did not focus exclusively on dropping out as one revision of an educational
decision, but we analyzed the choices of upgrading and dropping out as opposed to staying
within apprenticeship training using theoretical considerations from human capital theory
and matching theory. We used a data set on revisions of educational choices in vocational
education, where the different choices could be distinguished very clearly.
Our most interesting novel finding is probably the importance of financial incentives
as determinants of dropout decisions. It is especially disturbing that youths who named
financial distress as the reason for dissolving their apprenticeship contract have signifi-
cantly higher hazards of dropping out as opposed to graduate. This decision will probably
worsen their financial situation considerably in the long term, even if they are better off in
the short term with the higher salary of an unskilled worker as compared to the appren-
ticeship wage. There are two candidate explanations for the importance of this result. The
first one is that dropouts might suffer from a lack of awareness for the long-term con-
sequences of their dropout decision, either because they do not have information about
wages for graduates and dropouts from apprenticeship training or because they duck
issues. The second one is that their discount rate for future payoffs is simply too high,
implying that it is indeed a rational decision for them to drop out given their individual
discount rate. However, with the information available in this dataset, we are not able
to analyze these conjectures in more detail.
Revising an educational choice is not risky, but dropping out of the educational system
without a certificate that qualifies its holders for skilled jobs and many further training
possibilities is. Our results indicate that there are indeed different determinants for the dif-
ferent educational choices. In order to avoid “true” dropouts as opposed to changing and
upgrading behavior, there are several tentative policy implications based on our research
findings. Increasing youths’ awareness for the long-term consequences of dropping out
(including the foregone earnings losses due to lower wages and higher unemployment risk
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for unskilled workers) might be a promising strategy. Given the fact that financial distress
seems to be one of the main reasons to drop out completely, policies to improve secondary
school students’ financial literacy could be helpful to avoid getting into financial distress
in the first place. This strategy is likely to be more cost-effective than increasing appren-
tices’ wages in order to avoid financial distress, and given the fact that training firms
in Germany already bear net losses in apprenticeship training (Dionisius et al. 2009), it
is also not likely to reduce firms’ willingness to provide apprenticeship training as an
increase of wages probably would.
The main disadvantage of the data set that we used for the empirical analysis is without
any doubt the fact that it does not contain a true control group of successful graduates
from apprenticeship training. In addition, the lack of information on other possible deter-
minants such as the apprentices’ family background is a drawback. However, as there are
not many datasets available that contain information on revisions of educational choices,
we still believe that our results are interesting. We also hope that they might lead to the
development of studies focusing on revisions or to the inclusion of questions on revisions
and educational histories in existing data sets and studies.
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